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SOMEONE CALL 911, CRAWFORD IS DYING 
 
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 
People v. Duhs1 
(decided March 29, 2011) 
 
I. FACTS OF THE CASE 
Michael Duhs allegedly placed his girlfriend‟s three-year-old 
son into a tub of “scalding hot water” while he babysat the child, 
which resulted in second and third degree burns on the child‟s lower 
extremities.2  “When the child‟s mother returned home approximately 
five hours later, defendant and the mother took the child to the hos-
pital.”3  At Duhs‟ trial for first-degree assault and “endangering the 
welfare of a child,”4 the court allowed the emergency room pediatri-
cian to testify about a statement that the child made while no one else 
was present under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay 
rule.5 
The pediatrician testified that she “asked the child why he did 
not get out of tub” and that the child responded, in reference to the 
defendant, “he wouldn‟t let me out.”6  This statement was not in-
cluded in the medical records and the child did not testify at trial.7  
The pediatrician explained that she observed the child and wanted to 
 
1 947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 Id. at 618. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (“Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as rea-
sonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment” are not excluded as hearsay.). 
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know how he had been injured in order to assess how he should be 
treated.8  She stated that by phrasing the question the way that she 
did, she would be able to tell if the child had a “predisposing condi-
tion such as a neurological disorder that may have prevented him 
from getting out of the bathtub.”9 
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial 
court erred in allowing the testimony of the pediatrician.10  The de-
fendant contended that the admission of the pediatrician‟s testimony 
regarding the child‟s statement violated his Sixth Amendment consti-
tutional right to confrontation.11  The claimant based his argument on 
Crawford v. Washington12 and Davis v. Washington,13 where the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause pro-
hibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who 
[does] not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testi-
fy, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”14 
The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected the plaintiff‟s ar-
gument, concluding that the defendant‟s rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause were not violated because the child‟s statement “was not 
of a testimonial character.”15  The court stated that the child‟s re-
sponse did not constitute testimony because the “primary purpose” of 
the doctor‟s question was to enable her to provide proper medical 
treatment for the child‟s injuries.16  Although New York does not 
have its own code of evidence, there is a “recognized exception to the 
rule against hearsay” that allows for this kind of statement to be ad-
mitted into evidence.17  In both federal and New York law, an out-of 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 618-19. 
10 Id. at 618.  The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court.  Duhs, 947 
N.E.2d at 618. 
11 Id. 619. 
12 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
13 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
14 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 619-20. 
17 HON. LEE H ELKINS, JANE FOSBINDER & MELISSA BREGER, N.Y. LAW OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE §1:112 (2010) (“A person‟s out-of-court statement about his or her then existing 
physical condition, made to a treating physician or other medical professional, for the pur-
pose of obtaining medical care, is admissible under a recognized exception to the rule 
against hearsay.”). 
2
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2012] CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 981 
court statement to a physician or other medical professional, made for 
the purpose of attaining medical treatment, is admissible in court.18 
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENCE 
In Duhs, the New York Court of Appeals started its Confron-
tation Clause analysis with Crawford,19 decided in 2004.  The Court 
in Crawford looked to the Sixth Amendment‟s Confrontation Clause, 
which provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him.”20  
According to Crawford, a “witness” against the accused is one who 
“bear[s] testimony.”21  “Testimony,” according to the Court, is a “so-
lemn declaration or affirmation” that is made to establish or prove a 
fact.22  The Court explained that a formal statement to a government 
official would constitute testimony, whereas a casual remark to a 
friend would not.23  Therefore, the Court held that tape-recorded 
statements between the petitioner‟s wife and the police were testi-
monial, and thus the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to 
cross-examination.24  At a minimum, the court stated that “testimony” 
refers to “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations,” but left a more 
“comprehensive definition” for another time.25 
That time came in 2006 in Davis,26 where the Court estab-
lished an “ongoing emergency” guideline to clear up the difference 
between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.27  For instance, 
the Court explained that during police interrogations, statements are 
non-testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that the 
“primary purpose” of the exchange is “to meet an ongoing emergen-
 
18 FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
19 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 408. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
21 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
22 Id. (quoting WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
23 Id.  In Crawford, the State allowed testimonial statements to be admitted against the 
petitioner, without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  Id. 
at 68.  The Supreme Court held that this was in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. 
24 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  The statements were regarding the stabbing of a man named 
Kenneth Lee.  Id. at 38-39. 
25 Id. at 68. 
26 See generally Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (decided on June 19, 2006). 
27 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
3
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cy.”28  Statements made under circumstances that objectively indicate 
no ongoing emergency, where the primary purpose of an interroga-
tion is “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution” are testimonial in nature.29  In Davis, the Court 
came to the conclusion that there was an ongoing emergency by 
viewing the situation objectively30 and interpreted statements made 
during a 911 call as non-testimonial, because they were describing 
“current circumstances” that required “police assistance.”31  The 
Court stated that the declarant “was not acting as a witness” and was 
not testifying,
 
but was telling a 911 operator the details of a domestic 
disturbance in real time as the events unfolded.32  According to the 
Court, the declarant‟s statements were not “a weaker substitute for 
live testimony.”33 
The Davis decision came with a companion case, Hammon v. 
Indiana,34 where circumstances showed, from an objective viewpoint, 
that the interrogation in question was part of a criminal investiga-
tion.35  The Court stated that the interrogation in Hammon was simi-
lar to that of Crawford, as in both instances the declarant was “active-
ly separated from the defendant,” spoke of past criminal activity, and 
spoke to police well after the events in question took place.36  Ac-
cording to the Court, this situation was one of “official interrogation,” 
which constitutes a “substitute for live testimony” and is thus “inhe-
rently testimonial.”37  The declarant in this situation acted in the same 
manner as a witness on direct examination at a trial.38  For instance, 
there was no imminent threat to the declarant, and police questioned 
her to investigate a possible crime, not to assess an emergency in 




30 Id. at 828.  The Court stated that Michelle McCottry‟s phone call to 911 was “plainly a 
call for help against bona fide physical threat.”  Id. at 827. 
31 Davis, 547 U.S. at 814.  See id. at 817-818 (stating “[h]e‟s here jumpin‟ on me again” 
and “he‟s usin‟ his fists” in addition to telling the operator her former boyfriend‟s name). 
32 Id. at 814. 
33 Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)). 
34 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 




39 Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830. 
4
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and progressed, which is exactly “what a witness does on direct ex-
amination.”40  The Supreme Court in Hammon focused on how for-
mal this interrogation was, as well as the time lapse between the 
event in question and the time of statements.41 
III. LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
Lower courts were left to fill in the blanks from the Crawford 
and Davis decisions.  The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Tolliv-
er42 held that a “crucial aspect of Crawford is that it only covers hear-
say, [or] out-of-court statements[,]” which, according to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, are statements “offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted.”43  The court acknowledged that “while 
Crawford did not firmly define” testimony, Davis indicated that it 
“pertains to statements that a declarant makes in anticipation of . . . 
criminal prosecution.”44  In Tolliver, the court found not only that the 
statements in question were not hearsay, but also that they were not 
testimonial because the declarant was making “candid, real-time 
comments” to a government informant about a drug deal that was in 
progress.45  The comments were “not [a] recounting of past events.46 
In United States v. Saget,47 the Second Circuit had to decide 
whether an individual constituted a “„witness‟ who bears testimony” 
under the Confrontation Clause, when that individual did not know 
his statements were being used by police and eventually at trial.48  
According to Saget, Crawford advises that the determining factor in 
whether a declarant is a witness who bears testimony “is the decla-
rant‟s awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later 




42 454 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2006). 
43 Id. at 666 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801) (stating that hearsay “is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted”). 
44 Tolliver, 454 F.3d at 665. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). 




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
984 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
rant would “reasonably” have believed at that time.50 
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the assessment of the 911 
calls in Davis in United States v. Arnold.51  The court in Arnold stated 
that there might be a gray area as to what is testimonial and what is 
not when it comes to 911 calls and “on-the-scene statements.”52  The 
court stressed the importance of assessing a victim‟s statement “in its 
own context” in order to decide whether the statements are testimoni-
al or not.53  According to Arnold, such “boundary disputes will con-
tinue to emerge.”54  In Arnold, the court ultimately found that the vic-
tim‟s statements were non-testimonial,55 because they were prompted 
by an ongoing emergency, and not interrogation by police officers.56 
The Sixth Circuit stressed the importance analyzing the individual‟s 
statements within the circumstances of the case.57 
IV. MICHIGAN V. BRYANT EXPANSION 
The decisions in Crawford and Davis have served as the start-
ing point for Confrontation Clause analysis, but they may be dying 
off.  The Supreme Court further expanded its view on Confrontation 
Clause analysis in Michigan v. Bryant.58  Here, it stated that the Con-
frontation Clause is most concerned with restricting the use of “out-
of-court statements” by a witness when involved in an “out-of-court” 
interrogation by a state actor.59  The Court stated that the Confronta-
tion Clause seeks to ensure that an accused receives the opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness about the statements that were used for 
trial.60  According to Bryant, the “ongoing emergency” guideline in 
Davis forces a court to see if the primary purpose of an interrogation 
 
50 Id. at 229. 
51 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007). 
52 Id. at 189. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 192. 
56 Arnold, 486 F.3d at 191.  In Arnold, Tamica Gordon approached police officers crying 
and explained that defendant Joseph Arnold pulled out a gun and was trying to kill her.  Id. 
at 180. 
57 Id. at 189. 
58 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
59 Id. at 1155. 
60 Id. 
6
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is to “create a record for trial” or to respond to an emergency.
 61  If 
the situation genuinely involved an ongoing emergency, it falls out-
side the “scope of the Clause.”62 
In Bryant, the Court held that the interaction between a mor-
tally wounded man and the police served the purpose of resolving an 
active emergency situation, and therefore the statements made were 
non-testimonial.63  The Court in Bryant also stated that “there may be 
other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a state-
ment is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony.”64  Therefore, when a court finds 
that a statement is non-testimonial, the statement would possibly be 
excluded from a trial through the rules of hearsay, and not through 
the Confrontation Clause.65 
The Bryant case further explained the “ongoing emergency” 
situation as described in Davis.66  The Court stressed that “an objec-
tive analysis of the circumstances” is necessary in assessing the pri-
mary purpose of an encounter, including the “statements and actions 
of the parties” involved.67  According to Bryant, the purpose of the 
encounter must be viewed from the perspective of a “reasonable par-
ticipant.”68  The Court stated that “implicit in Davis is the idea” that 
statements are less likely to be fabricated when participants are ac-
tively resolving an emergency.69  The Court in Bryant compared this 




63 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.  The statements here involved the identification and descrip-
tion of the defendant Richard Bryant.  Compare id. at 1150 (holding that a wounded man‟s 
statements to police were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the statements were 
to receive police assistance), with Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830 (holding that a woman‟s state-
ments to police in investigating a possible crime were testimonial because the statements 
were “deliberately recounted” and “in response to police question” a significant amount of 
time after the event described was over), and Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-28 (holding that state-
ments made by a declarant during a 911 call were not testimonial because the statements 
were necessary to resolve a physical threat that was ongoing). 
64 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
65 Id.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).  See also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) 
(stating that “statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be ex-
cluded [from trial], if at all, only by hearsay rules” and not by the Confrontation Clause). 
66 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1157. 
7
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say law,”70 where there is no time for the declarant to fabricate be-
cause he or she is under the stress of an active situation.71  Addition-
ally, the Court noted that the Davis decision did not consider the im-
plications of medical emergencies.72  In Bryant, the Court explained 
that the medical condition of the victim is pertinent in analyzing his 
or her purpose in speaking with first responders.73  For example, a 
victim could be so debilitated that he or she may not “understand 
whether [his or] her statements are for the purpose of addressing an 
ongoing emergency or for the purpose of” use at a later trial.74  Ac-
cording to the Court, this is still to be viewed objectively from the 
viewpoint of a “reasonable victim” because it focuses on the under-
standing of the victim while in the victim‟s actual state.75   
Analyzing the facts in Duhs, using the Bryant decision, one 
can come to the objective conclusion that the main purpose of the 
child‟s conversation with the pediatrician was to treat the injuries.  
One could even argue that the child and the physician were actively 
resolving an emergency during the time that the child was being 
questioned by the doctor, and thus, that the statements made by the 
child were comparable to an excited utterance.76  In Duhs, the court 
held that the statements made by the child to his physician in the 
course of medical treatment were non-testimonial, and thus fell out-
side the scope of the Confrontation Clause.77  The court stated that 
since the statements were for the purpose of medical diagnosis and 
treatment, they were “admitted under that exception to the hearsay 
rule.”78 
 
70 Id.  Pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 803(2), an excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition.”  FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
71 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157. 
72 Id. at 1159.  Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150 (explaining that victim Anthony Co-
vington was found by police with a gunshot wound to his abdomen), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 
817 (“Michelle McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boy-
friend.”). 
73 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. 
74 Id. at 1161. 
75 Id. at 1161-62.  “The inquiry is still objective because it focuses on the understanding 
and purpose of a reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim – circumstances 
that prominently include the victim‟s physical state.”  Id. 
76 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining excited utterance). 
77 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619. 
78 Id. at 618 (quoting Davidson v. Cornell, 30 N.E. 573, 576 (N.Y. 1892)) (“[T]here is a 
strong inducement for the patient to speak truly of his pains and sufferings,” therefore, 
8
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V. NEW YORK DECISIONS 
In addition to discussing federal cases, the court in Duhs 
looked to its own cases in reaching its decision.  In People v. Raw-
lins,79 the Court of Appeals stated that the question of whether state-
ments are considered testimonial or non-testimonial “requires consid-
eration of multiple factors not all of equal import in every case.”80  
According to the court in Rawlins, the two most important factors in-
clude whether the statement was made in a manner that resembles an 
out-of-court examination, and whether the statement accused the de-
fendant of criminal activity.81  To find out whether these factors were 
fulfilled, the court formulated a test where a court must look to “the 
purpose of making . . . the statement, and the declarant‟s motive” for 
making the statement.82 
There is long-standing precedent in New York that statements 
made to a physician in the course of medical treatment are admissible 
in court.83  In Duhs, the court cited to its decision in Davidson v. 
Cornell,84 where it stated that statements to a physician “have quite 
uniformly been held admissible.”85  However, the statements must re-
late to a present condition, injury, or disease.86  According to David-
son, statements made to a physician only serve as admissible evi-
dence when the statements were made in the course of examination 
for the treatment of a present ailment.87  The decision in Davidson 
was at the heart of the court‟s holding in Duhs. 
Similar to the physician‟s questioning of the child in Duhs, a 
police officer in People v. Bradley88 questioned an injured woman in 
 
“statements expressive of [a patient‟s] present condition are permitted to be given as evi-
dence only when made to a physician for the purposes of treatment.”). 
79 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). 
80 Id. at 1033. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See ELKINS, FOSBINDER & BREGER, supra note 17 (“The basis for admissibility is the 
notion that the person‟s self-interest in receiving appropriate medical care ensures that the 
declarant will give accurate information to the medical professional.”). 
84 30 N.E. 573 (N.Y. 1892). 
85 Id. at 576. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 862 N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 2006). 
9
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order to decide what action to take immediately.89  The New York 
Court of Appeals in Bradley “accept[ed] the holdings of Crawford 
and Davis as the basis for [its] decision under both [the federal and 
state] constitutions.”90  The court found that the interaction precipi-
tated by the officer “was a normal and appropriate way to begin” 
dealing with the emergency and stated that any reasonable police of-
ficer would have acted in a similar manner.91  In this instance, the 
court found that the woman‟s statements were not testimonial under 
Crawford and Davis, as she was giving information to an officer who 
was questioning her during a present emergency.92  Therefore, the de-
fendant‟s rights were not violated under the Confrontation Clause.
 93 
In 2007, the New York Court of Appeals beat the Supreme 
Court to the chase by deciding, prior to Bryant, that the Davis deci-
sion should be interpreted broadly.  In People v. Nieves-Andino,94 the 
Court of Appeals recognized that Davis did not impose “a restricted 
interpretation of what constitutes a continuing emergency.”95  The 
court looked at the “ongoing emergency” guideline in a broader 
sense, stating that a first responder may reasonably assume that there 
is an ongoing emergency to be dealt with, even if the danger has 
passed.96  The responder‟s questioning may “objectively indicate” 
that his or her primary purpose was to prevent further harm from tak-
ing place.97  For example, in Nieves-Andino, police found the victim 
bleeding from a gunshot wound and asked the victim to explain what 
happened in order to assess the danger of the situation.98 
The Nieves-Andino decision can be applied to Duhs.99  For 
 
89 Id. at 81. 
90 Id. at 80. 
91 Id. at 81. 
92 Id. 
93 Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 79. 
94 872 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 2007). 
95 Id. at 1190. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1188-89. 
99 However, it is important to point out that in the majority of cases discussed, law en-
forcement, such as police officers, were the first responders that were questioning the vic-
tims in the emergency situations.  In Duhs, the situation was quite different, as the statements 
made by the declarant were in response to a physician during the course of immediate medi-
cal treatment.  Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 620-21.  According to Giles, statements made to physi-
cians do not even fall under the reach of the Confrontation Clause.  Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.  
10
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example, it could be argued that the active emergency in Duhs had 
passed in the time between the child‟s injury and the child‟s arrival at 
the hospital.100  However, just as police question to resolve an emer-
gency, doctors must question patients about their injuries in order to 
figure out how to treat them.  Thus, one can see that the interaction 
between the child and the doctor in Duhs was for the purpose of 
“render[ing] a diagnosis and administer[ing] medical treatment”101 
within the broad sense of an ongoing emergency described in Nieves-
Andino.102 
Bradley and Nieves-Andino emphasized the purpose of the 
first responder‟s questioning, rather than the declarant‟s answers, to 
determine whether a declarant‟s statement was testimonial or non-
testimonial.103  However, Rawlins, the court‟s most current decision 
in this area, indicated that a court must focus on the statements of all 
parties involved.104  This is a broader approach, which was adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Bryant.105  In Rawlins, the court placed more 
emphasis on the motive behind the victim‟s responses, rather than the 
motives behind the first responder‟s questioning.106  In Duhs, the 
court focused more on the purpose of the doctor‟s inquiry than the 
purpose of the child‟s statement,107 but, nonetheless, cited to the 
broad interpretation of an “ongoing emergency” from Bryant.108  The 
court sought guidance from Bryant, rather than Crawford and Davis, 
which were relied on unsuccessfully by the defendant.109  The court 
in Duhs also stressed the importance of the standard rules of hearsay 
 
Likewise, in Davidson, the New York Court of Appeals held that statements made by an in-
dividual to a doctor regarding his or her suffering are admissible statements.  Davidson, 30 
N.E. at 576. 
100 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 618 (discussing the time line of events, specifically, that the 
child‟s mother came home five hours after the child was injured and, at that point, took him 
to the hospital). 
101 Id. at 620. 
102 Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d at 1190. 
103 Id.; Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 81. 
104 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
105 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156; see People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1st Dep‟t 2005) (taking a position that was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Davis in 2006).  In Coleman, the court held that the conveyance of information to a 911 dis-
patcher was not “structured questioning” and thus, did not render a testimonial response.  Id. 
106 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. 
107 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619-20. 
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in making its determination because there may be circumstances oth-
er than ongoing emergencies where statements are not a substitute for 
live testimony.110  The rules of hearsay weighed heavily in the court‟s 
decision because of the long-standing tradition that statements made 
in the course of medical treatment are admissible in court.111 
VI. POST-DUHS 
Ten months after Duhs, the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment decided People v. Shaw,112 which dealt with statements made to 
both a police officer and a physician.113  Here the court found that the 
defendant‟s right of confrontation was not violated because neither 
statement constituted testimony.114  The court held that the primary 
purpose of the victim‟s statement to a responding police officer was 
to enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency because there 
was an armed suspect in the vicinity.115  Additionally, the police 
needed to learn what happened “to determine whether the victim re-
quired prompt medical assistance.”116  The second statement at issue 
in this case “was made to a gynecologist” who was treating the victim 
at the hospital.117  The court found that the statement made to the doc-
tor was non-testimonial, by looking to the Duhs decision, because 
“the doctor acted primarily as a treating physician.”118 
Like Giles and Davidson, this decision takes the view that 
“the right of confrontation is not absolute,”119 because of the admissi-
bility of statements for purposes of medical treatment120 and other 
 
110 Id. 
111 Davidson, 30 N.E. at 576. 
112 914 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2011).  The defendant in this case was 
convicted of rape and burglary, both in the first degree.  Id. at 156.  The judgment of the trial 
court, “sentencing him . . . to consecutive terms of twelve and a half to twenty-five years and 
three and a half to seven years [was] unanimously affirmed.”  Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  




119 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Procedure § 2094 (2011) (citing In re German F., 821 
N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (Fam. Ct. 2006)). 
120 FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
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well-established hearsay exceptions, such as excited utterances.121  
While not at issue in Shaw, a court could potentially find that a 
statement made by a declarant to the police at a crime scene consti-
tutes an excited utterance.122  Likewise, a court could also find that a 
telephone conversation with a 911 dispatcher falls under this excep-
tion.123 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Prior to Bryant, courts were left to expand upon Davis as they 
saw fit.  For instance, the New York Court of Appeals has put more 
emphasis on the questions of first responders rather than the answers 
of declarants in deciding if statements are testimonial.124  In Duhs, the 
court may have chosen to analyze the circumstances this way because 
the declarant was a three-year-old child, so he may not have had any 
reason for his statements other than his own physical well being in 
mind.  The court analyzed the primary purpose of the physician‟s 
question, holding that it was a medical inquiry during the course of 
treatment.125  Therefore, the court found that the child‟s statement 
was properly admitted under the hearsay exception for statements 
made in the course of medical treatment.126 
The Duhs decision has already been cited,127 and is likely to 
serve precedential value for other cases that involve statements made 
to medical professionals.  The Duhs decision should be enough to 
dispose of claims by a defendant that his or her constitutional right to 
confrontation has been violated by the admission of patient testimo-
ny.  However, courts may continuously be faced with the issue of 
what is testimonial and what is not in cases where a declarant has 
spoken to police.  By broadening the “ongoing emergency” guideline 
from Davis, the Court in Bryant has rendered the Crawford decision 
useless.  Future courts will utilize this broader view to guide their 
 
121 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
122 See id. (stating that excited utterances are statements made while under the stress of an 
event). 
123 Id. 
124 Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d at 1190; Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 81. 
125 Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619-20. 
126 Id. at 618.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
127 See Shaw, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (citing Duhs to support its holding that the victim‟s 
statement to the gynecologist was not testimonial). 
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analysis, but the question of what exactly constitutes testimony will 
not always be clear.  Courts will be forced to resolve this question on 
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